Introduction
The retail trade sector is of great importance in Spain, accounting for 4.7% of the economy's GVA in 2006 and for 9.5% of total employment in 2007. Its significance for the economy as a whole is, however, even greater insofar as retailing involves placing a large portion of consumer goods at the disposal of customers, meaning that the behaviour of this sector may be of crucial importance for variables such as final product prices.
Retailing is characterised, moreover, by very extensive regional regulations in for Italy, and the IMF (2004) for Spain, all find that the more restrictive retailing policy is, the lower employment will be in the sector. Along the same lines, Skuterud (2005) provides evidence of how deregulation of Sunday and public holiday trading in Canada led to an increase in employment. Likewise focusing on shop opening hours, but for the United States, Burda and Weil (2005) conclude that the greater the restrictiveness of regulations, the lower employment, wages and productivity in the sector are, but they find no significant effects on prices. Nonetheless, the IMF (2004) and Hoffmaister (2006) find that, in Spain's case, the barriers to freedom of trading translate into higher prices. Likewise for Spain, Orea (2008) 2 finds that the regulations introduced in 1997 have been effective in protecting small retailers, although the subsequent increase in regulations does not appear to have had a significant impact. For Italy, Schivardi and Viviano (2008) identify a negative relationship between barriers to entry in the sector and productivity, on the one hand, and the incorporation of information technologies, on the other, while the relationship is positive in the case of business margins and prices, although the evidence of this latter effect is weaker.
Some of the above-mentioned papers opt to construct indicators of the degree of regulation in the sector that allow comparisons to be made over time and This paper seeks to build on this avenue of research by devising regional retail trade regulation indicators. The paper will consider a broader range of regulations than those envisaged by the IMF (2004) and Hoffmaister (2006) . Also, similarly to the work of the OECD, the various restrictions will be weighted to an extent going beyond simple aggregation. Once the indicators are obtained, the aim is to estimate how 3. In the preparation of these indicators, the OECD compiled information from the member states based on questionnaires for 1998 and 2003. The questions referred to: trade registers for opening food stores; specific licences for food stores; specific regulations for large retail outlets; protectionism by established firms against new entrants; regulation of shop opening hours; and price controls. 4. This aspect is beyond the scope of this paper since, although some price controls remain in place (as is the case of the prices of non-advertised drugs and of certain products sold in tobacconists'), there are no differences across the regions. For the same reason, the need to register to be able to open a food store is not taken into account either. 5. Specifically, each region is catalogued on the basis of four indicators, namely: degree of interventionism of the legislation on shop opening hours; definition of large retail establishments; moratoria; and an indicator of legal activism in the face of national legislation. 6. However, in the case of legal activism their weight is halved. 7. The other variables common to both papers are: definition of large retail outlets (a) on the basis of their location, (b) on the basis of multiple criteria, and (c) in accordance with capital share criteria; requirement of a second licence for hard discount stores; restrictions on medium-sized outlets regarding installation, expansion, sale and change of ownership; requirement of a market viability plan for obtaining of the specific licence; and moratoria. 8. The aspects considered are: definition of large retail outlets; moratoria; Domestic Trade Advisory Committee involved in the retail trade licence procedure; Sectoral Plans for Retail Installations; and maximum number of Sunday and public holiday openings. 9. Based on data on the existence of moratoria on new retail openings, the number of authorised Sunday and public holiday openings, barriers to entry and the existence of taxes on large retail outlets.
regional legislation may have affected various key variables of retail trade in the Spanish economy.
It should be highlighted that the study focuses on regional regulations, despite the fact that municipal legislation may prove fundamental in some instances,
given that moving to the municipal level would increase the number of rules to be considered enormously. Moreover, it takes no account of regulations that are common to all regional governments, since that would not introduce differences when comparing the degree of regulation of retail trade across the regions. The indicators are to be constructed for the period 1997-2007.
Following this introduction, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the regulatory changes affecting retail trade at both national and regional level. Section 3 explains how the indicators are constructed. Section 4 estimates the effects of regional regulations on commercial density, inflation and employment in the sector. Section 5 draws some brief conclusions. Finally, completing the document are several annexes detailing the methodology used to construct the indicators and the database employed in the estimates. The justification for regional regulation of retailing is to be found in the preambles and articles of the different regulations, which highlight the purported benefits of regulating the retail trade (e.g. better town planning, greater consideration of environmental issues). The difficulties involved in measuring these factors place them beyond the scope of this paper.
As is indicated above, exhaustive analysis of retail trade regulations is an arduous and laborious task that is beyond the aim of this paper. Instead, several aspects, which the literature considers to be the most representative, have been selected for analysis: opening hours, seasonal sales, definition of outlets that require a regional government licence, moratoria and specific taxes on large retail outlets. These are also the aspects that will be subsequently considered for construction of the indicators of the level of regulation.
National regulations
To place the regional regulations in context, it is a good idea to review developments in national legislation, as there is a certain parallel between the two sets of regulations.
In fact, some regional governments generally adapt their regulations to national legislation, although there are also cases in which national legislation has been influenced by regional regulations.
In the case of shop opening hours, national legislation has been key. 
Regional regulations
This section analyses how certain regulatory aspects of retailing have evolved: opening hours, seasonal sales, definition of outlets that require a regional government licence, moratoria and specific taxes on large retail outlets.
In the case of opening hours, national legislation has set the pace for changes at regional level. The regulations finally adopted by the regional governments are very similar to the minimum conditions established in national legislation, especially insofar as overall weekly opening hours are concerned. Indeed, as ; see Table 2 for a summary of these data.
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Turning to seasonal sales, 21 State legislation sets two sales periods per year, one starting in early January and the other in the summer holidays, each with a minimum duration of one week and a maximum duration of two months. Retailers are free to determine the duration of their seasonal sales within the limits established in national legislation, but the specific dates for the sales are set by the regional governments. Accordingly, in this respect the differences between regions lie in the duration of the seasonal sales. Here this variable is measured as the number of days of sales permitted each year, including both winter and summer sales. 22 As Table 3 shows, the regions split into two main groups: around 155 days' sales (e. How each regional government defines "large retail outlets" is important as they all now require that these outlets apply for a second (regional) licence in addition to the usual municipal one. These definitions vary considerably, both between regions and over time. As Table 4 shows, the regional governments have gradually made their criteria more stringent. Thus, although in 1997 "large retail outlets" were usually defined in terms of floor space (m 2 ), a decade later the criteria had multiplied, save in Cantabria, Galicia and Asturias, with different minimum floor space requirements according to the population of the municipality in which the outlets were to be located. 24 In other cases, the criteria are based on the number of employees (and the floor space criteria are subsidiary, i.e. they are only applied when the criteria base don the number of employees are not used), as, for example, in the Balearic Islands
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Since 1998 in Madrid and Galicia, where municipalities may authorise adding one or two trading days to the total set for the region as a whole, and in 1999 and 2000 in Castile and Leon, where the addition of a local holiday was permitted in certain circumstances.
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There was no regional legislation on opening hours in the Basque Country before February 2005. In theory this meant there were no limits on opening hours, although in practice no stores opened on Sundays or public holidays. And this remains true today, even though regional legislation envisages that retail outlets with more than 400 m 2 may open on eight Sundays or public holidays. 21. Under Retail Trade Law 7/1996, seasonal sales are understood to be when goods are on sale, in the same store in which they are usually sold, at a reduced price, excluding defective products or those purchased for sale below the usual price. 22. Calculated excluding Sundays, but not adjusted for public holidays or Sunday openings. 23. The 104 days' sales for the Canary Islands is the average (104.077) and the mode (104) for the region in the period considered. The mode is included for purposes of simplicity, although there are differences of one day, according to the island and the year in question. 24. In this respect, in 2003 the Spanish Competition Court ruled that the criterion linking the definition of "large retail outlets" to population ignores the mobility of shoppers and fails to consider that the catchment area of such outlets generally extends beyond the specific municipality in which they are located. since 2002. Lastly, other regional governments apply criteria based on the total number of outlets of a specific company, or on the total amount of floor space already open in the region, as, for example, in Asturias.
The minimum floor space required in order for stores to be considered "large retail outlets" has gradually diminished in most regions, signifying that the need for application for a second licence has gradually spread to increasingly smaller outlets.
The exceptions, in this case, being Aragon, Cantabria, Valencia, Navarre, Asturias and La Rioja, all of which have maintained the same criteria for the past 11 years, and the Canary Islands and Galicia where the floor space required in order for stores to be considered "large retail outlets" has actually increased.
Specific regional licences may also be required, even if the stores in question are not "large retail outlets". For example, in the case of hard discount stores (see Table 5 ), which are defined, with minor variations between regions, according to the minimum number of "own brand" products for sale and a minimum number of stores Table 6 ).
The tax base is the number of m 2 of retail activity. In general, the larger the floor space or the catchment population (Asturias), the higher the tax. But the exemption threshold of the first few thousand square metres means that, in practice, the tax is borne only by "large retail outlets". As indicated, the amount of tax paid varies according to the number of m 2 ; the lowest rate stands at €12/m 2 in Navarre.
Many regional governments also have retail moratorium regulations (see Table   7 ), banning large retail openings in the region for a specific period of time. 25. In all four cases, appeals have been filed against these taxes with the Constitutional Court.
Construction of indicators
The 
Estimation of the effects of retail trade regulations
As advanced in the introduction, several studies have found that retail trade regulations have significant effects on various economic variables in the sector. Here the synthetic indicator constructed in the previous section will be used to estimate the effects of regulation on commercial density, the numbers employed in the sector and inflation. In addition, a number of tests will be conducted with the individual indicators 30 to assess the sensitivity of the inflation rate to different types of regulations.
Model
The estimates are obtained by analysis using panel data techniques, with the following specification:
where Xi,t is the economic variable of the retail trade of interest in region i and year t; a is a constant; Tt are artificial variables (one for each year of the sample) which have a value of one in year t and zero in other years; IRi,t is the regulation indicator of region i in year t; Yi,t are other explanatory variables of region i in year t; i are unobservable explanatory variables of region i; and vi,t is an error term. The coefficient 1 , which accompanies the regulation indicator, is the coefficient of interest in this study.
More specifically, the variables which will be considered are commercial density (calculated for different distribution formats), the employment in the sector and the inflation rate of the retail products sold. 31 The artificial time variables are intended to capture time effects common to all regions, such as, for example, the cyclical position of the economy. Note that if regulation was very similar in all regions, its effect would be indistinguishable from that reflected by the time variables.
In some cases the significant regulation is not that currently in place; rather, that in force some years earlier may be of greater importance. Specifically, this may be the case when opening a new retail outlet, since several years may elapse between the time the decision is taken and the date when it actually opens its doors to the public (this time may be needed to develop the land, obtain all the relevant permits, build the establishment, etc.). In fact, sector experts estimate that, depending on the municipality, it takes from six to 18 months to open a supermarket, the average being around ten months, and up to four years to open a large retail outlet. Similarly, employment, insofar as it depends on the number of outlets, will also be sensitive to the regulation in place in previous years. For these reasons, the foregoing equation has been estimated for various lags of the regulation variable.
30. In neither case, and for reasons described earlier, do these estimates include the Basque Country. 31. For more information about the database, see Annex B.
Estimation and results
In all estimates, allowance was made for unobservable variables by performing fixed-effects estimation and random-effects estimation, 32 and the Hausman test was used to choose between one or the other estimation method. Only the option selected is reported here. In any event, the existence of varying effects across regions was previously confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan test.
Estimates were made for different commercial density variables. 33 Tables 8 to   11 give commercial density estimates for the total retail distribution formats, for traditional food stores, for supermarkets and for hypermarkets, respectively. 34 Given that the commercial density variables relate to 1 January of each year, while the regulation variable refers to the yearly average, it was considered appropriate to add, as an explanatory variable, the synthetic regulation indicator (denoted "rspv" in the tables) lagged by at least one period. Also tested as possible additional explanatory variables in the estimation were GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, both as proxies for demand, although with different expected signs (positive for GDP per capita and negative for the unemployment rate). Similarly, the average wage in the sector was included as a cost variable. 35 In general, commercial density seems to be sensitive to the unemployment rate; however, except for the estimates relating to hypermarkets and for a single specification in the case of supermarkets, GDP per capita and average wage in the sector usually do not differ significantly from zero.
In any event, it should be noted that the results are not always robust to changes in the specifications and must therefore be regarded with due caution. The aforementioned tables seem to show that a lesser degree of regulation, as measured by our synthetic indicator, is associated with lower commercial density in all the distribution formats analysed, except, as was to be expected, for hypermarkets, where less regulation entailed a higher number of hypermarkets per inhabitant. In addition, the coefficient values estimated tended to be higher in the supermarket density regressions than in those for traditional food stores. This suggests a greater impact of regulation on the former. 36 In the specific case of hypermarkets, the regulation found to be significant is that in place five years ago. 37 Since the equations refer to the density at 1 January, this may indicate that the time needed to open a hypermarket is around 4.5 years. This is similar to the time reported by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) for France (four years).
The estimates of the inflation rate in the sector are expressed as per-unit in Table 12 . In these equations the signs of GDP per capita, average wage growth in the 32. With fixed effects it is assumed that the unobservable variables vary by region. With random effects it is assumed they also have a distribution for each region. 33. Estimates were also made, by type of outlet, for the number of square metres per inhabitant. However, the results were very similar to others reported here and are thus not included in this paper. They are nonetheless available on request from the authors. 34. Both for this variable and for those presented below, only those equations in which the regulation variable differs significantly from zero at the 5% level are given. The degree of robustness of the proposed estimates to alternative estimates is also reported. 35. For the same reason as that stated for the synthetic regulation indicator, all these variables are lagged by one period. 36. The coefficients of the commercial density equations are not strictly comparable with those of other definitions because they relate to different periods. However, the period is the same when broken down by distribution format. 37. Also, more hypermarkets per inhabitant are observed with increasing GDP per capita, whereas the relationship between average wage in the sector and hypermarket commercial density is negative.
sector and unemployment rate of the region are as expected (positive for the first two and negative for the last). Also, lesser regulation is found to be associated with lower inflation. 38 The sign and significance of this relationship between degree of regulation and inflation are relatively robust to alternative specifications. However, the coefficients obtained for the regulation variable vary notably depending on the variables included in the estimate.
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The estimates relating to employment in retailing are shown in Table 13 .
Again, the signs of GDP per capita (positive) and of the average wage in the sector (negative) are as expected. On this occasion, the degree of regulation is found to be negatively related to employment in the sector, in line with most studies on this subject. This relationship is, moreover, fairly robust to the different specifications 38. Note that, unlike in the case of commercial density, the inflation rate and all the explanatory variables measure the annual average value. 39. It should be noted that the estimation period also varies depending on the variables used.
Conclusions
Several international and national organizations have repeatedly stated that Spanish retail trade is subject to extensive regulation, generating numerous barriers to competition which, in turn, may be causing distortions in the functioning of the sector.
To analyse this issue, a set of regional retail trade regulation indicators was first formulated for the period 1997-2007 relating to legislation on total weekly opening hours, Sunday and public holiday trading, seasonal sales, definitions of establishments requiring a regional government licence, the requirement for hard discount stores to have a regional government licence, moratoria in retail trade licence issuance and specific taxes on large retail outlets. The indicator building strategies followed were, first, that of developing regulation indicators for each of the administrative requirements considered, and, second, that of constructing a synthetic indicator of all of them using factor analysis. A word of caution regarding this synthetic indicator is in order for two reasons. First, only a subset of administrative requirements was taken into account and thus many are excluded, 40 such as, for example, those imposed by local governments. Second, given that the construction of a synthetic indicator requires weights to be set for each of the factors considered, it was decided to set these weights by a purely statistical method. This has the advantage that it is not affected by the researcher's subjective opinion, but it does not take into account possible differences in the potential impact of each of the regulatory aspects on the different economic variables. Subject to these qualifications, it can be concluded that, in general, the regulation currently in place in the retail trade sector is more restrictive than at the beginning of the period under analysis (1997). The inter-regional differences in the degree of regulation are also greater, and there are significant differences in how they have evolved over time.
The synthetic indicator has been used to explain the regional differences observed in commercial density, employment in the sector and the retail inflation rate.
Once again, mention should be made of the limitations of the analysis due, inter alia, to the scarcity of information in terms both of variables and number of observations.
Consequently, this may affect the robustness of the econometric results. Subject to this qualification, the results seem to confirm the findings of other authors for other countries, which associate greater regulation with higher inflation, lower employment in the sector and higher commercial density. In the latter case, except for hypermarkets, for which lesser regulation is associated with a higher number of hypermarkets per inhabitant.
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Nevertheless, given the objective of this study, the regulation common to all regions was not taken into account because it has no bearing on the differences in regulation between regions.
Annex A: Indicator construction methodology
Quantitative indicators for each variable
As a first step towards constructing a synthetic indicator (methodology described below), it is necessary to convert each regulatory aspect of regional regulations into a numerical variable.
In the case of the regulations on overall weekly opening hours, Sundays and public holidays 41 and seasonal sales, this step is immediate. This is because the The requirement of a regional licence for setting up hard discount stores was handled more simply, using a binary variable which takes the value 1 for the years and regions where it was in force and the value 0 for the years and regions where it was 41. It should be pointed out that when the Sunday and public holiday variable was constructed for the Basque Country, the de facto situation rather than current legislation was taken into account. This is because the large retail outlets have not opened on Sundays and public holidays in this region, despite, on occasions, having stated their intention to do so [see the appearance of the chairman of the Basque Competition Court (2008). 42. Thus, for example, according to the criteria applied in Aragon, the total of 1,341 m² in Table A .1 is the sum of 600 m² multiplied by 0.425 (the proportion of the population living in 2001 in municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants), plus 1,000 m² multiplied by 0.064 (the proportion of the population living in municipalities with 20,000 to 499,999 inhabitants), plus 2,000 m² multiplied by 0.511 (the proportion of the population living in municipalities with at least 500,000 inhabitants).
not. In cases in which the requirement was not in force for a full year, the value it takes corresponds to the percentage, expressed in per-unit terms, of the days in the year in which it was in force. The same procedure was used for the specific taxes and moratoria variables. Only moratoria on large retail outlets are included in the latter variable and, therefore, other moratoria which could be defined as "relative" or of another type are not calculated.
Once the quantitative variables for each regulatory aspect considered were available, they were transformed for cross-comparison purposes. To this end, they were expressed on a scale of 0 to 10, 10 being the maximum restriction level and 0 being the minimum restriction level. This scale is arbitrary and was chosen, without affecting the findings of the paper, for its simplicity. Furthermore, the range of 0 to 10 covers the theoretical situation (of the non-existence of restrictions and maximum restrictions, respectively) and, therefore, it does not reflect the extreme values of the sample. 43 Consequently, this range is not sensitive to regulatory changes which may occur in the future. 
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The only exception is the variable relating to the definition of "large retail outlets", in which case the nonexistence of restrictions (value zero) was considered equivalent to the provisions of national legislation, defining large retail outlets as those with at least 2,500 m². 44. The total number of Sundays and public holidays in a year is 66, or 67 in leap years. 45. That is, 10 would be assigned if the individual indicator was 0 m 2 . 46. It should be noted that when the moratoria indicator was calculated, the only moratoria taken into account were those representing a complete ban on openings of large retail outlets, thus excluding the moratoria in Catalonia on supermarkets in 2001 and the partial moratorium in 2006, and the relative moratoria in force in the Canary Islands.
Construction of a synthetic indicator
As indicated above, the aim of the synthetic indicator is to summarise all the information included in the individual indicators in a single index, to highlight the differences in the level of regulation of retail trade by region.
Before creating this indicator, the particular case of the Basque Country should be mentioned. In this region, until a short time ago, there was no legislation on overall weekly opening hours or Sunday and public holiday openings. Consequently, if the national regulations were applied, this would be equivalent to assuming that there were no limits on the overall weekly opening hours and Sunday and public holiday openings envisaged in national legislation. However, as mentioned above, in practice, the large retail outlets in this region do not open on non-business days and there is no evidence of actual compliance with overall weekly opening hours. In these circumstances, and considering that the aim was to create a regulation indicator that could be used as an explanatory variable of the changes in the main sector aggregates at regional level, it was decided to exclude the Basque Country 47 from the synthetic indicator.
Once the individual indicators had been calculated, the synthetic indicator was constructed using the same methodology as that employed by the OECD 48 for its structural indicators. Specifically, factor analysis, which makes it possible to obtain a weight for each variable and to aggregate them in a single indicator, was applied.
These weights are correlated with the higher or lower variability of the different variables, i.e. factor analysis gives more weight to those variables with a higher variability between the different regions and years. The weights constructed in this way have the advantage of responding to the data, rather than to the subjective opinion of the authors about the importance of any particular variable.
Factor analysis summarises the individual indicators in a number of "factors" which reflect their underlying structure. Specifically, this technique is based on the correlations between individual indicators (see Table A .10) and analyses whether the individual indicators follow any pattern of relationships, so that the data can be reordered into a smaller set of factors which summarises the interrelationships observed. Consequently, for it to make sense to use factor analysis, the variables must be correlated, since if there is no or little correlation it is unlikely they will share common factors. To check that this requirement was met, Bartlett's test of sphericity was applied 49 and was passed satisfactorily. Similarly, Kaiser, Meyer and Olkin's measure of sample suitability is usually used to confirm that factor analysis is appropriate. This measure, which takes into account partial correlation coefficients,
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If the Basque Country is not excluded, the indicator obtained is quite different, largely because, as it is considered that this region places no limits on overall weekly opening hours, the variance of this variable increases and its weight in the synthetic indicator also rises. The results obtained when the Basque Country is included are presented in Chart A.1 and in also supported the use of this technique for the individual indicators in this paper (see Table A .11).
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Each factor is defined as a set of coefficients that measure the correlation between the individual indicators and the latent factor. The principal components method was used to extract the factors. making it easier to interpret the factors. Table A .11 shows the results obtained.
In order to construct the synthetic indicator, in keeping with standard practice, only those factors which met the three following criteria were selected: they had an associated eigen-value greater than one; individually they explained at least 10% of the data variance; and together, they explained at least 60% of the data variance. Consequently, the first three factors were selected. Both the first and third factors have a clear economic interpretation. Thus, the first factor basically reflects regulations on opening hours (both overall weekly opening hours and Sunday and public holiday openings), while the third factor relates to licensing regulations (definition of large retail outlets, moratoria on trading licences and the requirement of a regional licence for hard discount stores). Lastly, the second factor is closely related to the seasonal sales and the levying of a specific tax on large outlets.
The last stage for construction of the synthetic indicator was to calculate the weights. Once again, following the OECD methodology, each individual indicator was weighted in accordance with the proportion of variance explained by the associated factor, while each factor in turn was previously weighted, taking into account its contribution to explaining the total sample variance. The resultant weights are presented in Table A .11. The overall weekly opening hours and Sunday and public holiday trading variables accounted for a combined weight of 37%, while the variables related to regional licences (the hard discount stores, large retail outlets and retail moratoria variables) accounted for a weight of 35%. The seasonal sales and specific tax variables each had a weight of 14%.
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It is considered acceptable to apply a factor analysis model to data as from a value of 0.5 for Kaiser, Meyer and Olkin's measure of sample suitability. 51. The advantage of this method is that since it is descriptive, it requires no assumptions about the data generation process. 52. For the rotation the varimax method was used to minimise the number of variables that have a high loading on the same factor.
Annex B: Description of database
It is difficult to compile sector data on a regional level, and, when obtained, in many cases the data relate to a limited time period.
Commercial density was the first dependent variable used. It was constructed taking, as the denominator, the population according to the Regional Accounts of the INE (National Statistics Office) and, as the numerator, the number of retail activities subject to economic activity tax as at 1 January of each year, drawn from La Caixa's Economic Yearbooks. The advantage of this latter statistical source is that it facilitates a breakdown of retail activities by type of outlet. In particular, estimates were made for the aggregate series, traditional food stores (as an exponent of traditional stores), supermarkets and hypermarkets (as a representative of large retail outlets).
Nevertheless, these series present several weaknesses. Andalusia  72  72  72  72  90  90  90  90  72  72  72   Aragon  72  72  72  72  90  90  90  90  72  72  72   Balearic Islands  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72  72   Canary Islands  72  72  72  72  90  90  90  90  72  72  72   Cantabria  72  72  72  72  90  90  90  90  72  72  72   Castile-La Mancha  72  72  72  72  90  90  90  90  90  72  72   Castile and Leon  72  72  72  72  90  90  90  90  90  90 a. The number of days on which retailers may choose to hold seasonal sales. Calculated not including Sundays, but not adjusted for public holidays. b. There are minor differences -one day more or less -according to the different islands and years. Over 75000
10000-25000
Over 25000
Up to 5000
-15000
Over 40000
Under 10000
Over 50000
Not applicable
-50000
Up to 10000
-25000
Over 240000
Under 40000
Under 20000
Over 20000
Under 3000
Over 20000 a. Factor analysis using the principal components method and rotating the factors using the varimax method. Excludes the Basque Country.
DURATION (IN DAYS) OF SPECIFIC TRADING LICENCE (OR EQUIVALENT MEASURE BY REGION) FOR HARD DISCOUNT STORES

COMMERCIAL DENSITY ESTIMATES (a)
ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF TRADITIONAL FOOD STORES / POPULATION (a)
ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF SUPERMARKETS / POPULATION (a)
ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF HYPERMARKETS / POPULATION (a)
INFLATION RATE ESTIMATES (a)
ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN RETAILING (a)
